Posted by Martin Senn on September 3rd, 2010

I am currently preparing a lecture on “The Proliferation of Nuclear and Missile Technologies: Trends, Causes, Countermeasures”. The great thing about preparing a lecture is that, in addition to having time to revisit some classic texts, you have an opportunity to systematize your thoughts, develop new ideas and find new sources.

There is one new source (actually two) I want to share with you because I think that it is timely (see, for instance, Johan Bergenas’ article “The Nuclear Domino Myth”) and very well done:

Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century, edited by William C. Potter with Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova. Volume 1 – The Role of Theory, Volume 2 – A Comparative Perspective.

I will be happy to share my lecture plan with you on this blog by the end of September.

P.S. I will enrich my lecture with guest speakers and additional film-screenings (Dr. Strangelove, The Day after Trinity, Soviet War Scare 1983) and would love to show “Countdown to Zero” to my students. Does anyone know whether/when the film will be released on DVD or is already available?

Posted by Martin Senn on August 27th, 2010

C-x-I is back from a short summer break!

After the arrests of terrorism suspects in Canada, my co-blogger Anthony Seaboyer has been analyzing the events:

Two of the arrested suspects worked in hospitals. As an x-ray technician one of them had direct access to radioactive material. So far the authorities are only reporting that the group was working on improvised explosive devices (IED). They have so far not made any connection relating to radioactive materials. But have also refrained from any kind of statement relating to the design of the IEDs the group planed to assemble. 

Click here to watch Anthony’s interview at CTV and here for his interview at CBC. His op-ed in the Ottawa Citizen is available here.

Posted by Martin Senn on July 22nd, 2010

Do you remember North Korea’s announcement of a successful nuclear fusion in May? Here is Iran’s follow-up (retrieved from Uskowi on Iran):

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) said today that during a ceremony on Saturday, it will start research on construction of an experimental nuclear fusion reactor. No nation has yet succeeded in building nuclear fusion reactors. These reactors are to use technology that is cleaner than existing nuclear power plants, making construction of such reactors a major achievement for AEOI [IRNA, 21 July]

Before you start thinking about possible military applications you better read Jeffrey Lewis’ post “Can North Korea Build the H-Bomb?” at 38 North.

A brief note: the Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency have published the latest edition of the “Red Book”. Click here for more information.

Posted by Martin Senn on July 20th, 2010

I had planned my next post to be on nuclear terrorism, but after I obtained a copy of John Coster-Mullen’s book Atom Bombs: The Top Secret Inside Story of Little Boy and Fat Man (thank you, Prof. Schmucker!) and did a quick Google search on the author and his book, I have to share this brief documentary with you!

In December 2008, an interesting article on “Atomic John” was published by David Samuels in The New Yorker:

Among other things, Coster-Mullen’s book makes clear that our belief in the secrecy of the bomb is a theological construct, adopted in no small part to shield ourselves from the idea that someone might use an atomic bomb against us. Surely, hostile powers could easily obtain the kind of information that Coster-Mullen has acquired, however painstakingly, in his spare time. Any nation that can master the challenges of the atomic-fuel cycle and produce a critical mass of uranium or plutonium, as Iran is reported to be on the verge of doing, would have little difficulty in producing a workable bomb. Given a sufficient quantity of highly enriched uranium, a small number of engineers working for a terrorist group like Al Qaeda or Hezbollah could easily assemble a homemade nuclear device.

Posted by Martin Senn on July 13th, 2010

After a long pause I am finally back in the blogosphere with an update on last February’s conference “Ballistic Missile Defense: Global and Regional Dynamics” and a brief comment on the reappearance of Fidel Castro.

Thanks to the great work of my university’s new media department (great job, Andi!), the audio and video libraries with all the speeches of the two conference days are now available. You can access the speeches via the follow-up section on the conference web-page or via the iTunesU Channel of the University of Innsbruck.

Meanwhile, Fidel Castro has made a reappearance on TV with a warning against a nuclear escalation in the Middle East. The Guardian reports on Castro’s remarks (incl. a brief video):

Dressed casually in a tracksuit top over a checked shirt, the man once known for always wearing military fatigues, interspersed his warnings of imminent nuclear conflict with a rambling history lecture that ranged from the roots of the Korean war to the Cuban missile crisis, by way of the war in Angola.

“We have experiences of being close to it [nuclear war],” he said. “Now I believe the threat of war has greatly increased. They [the US] is playing with fire.”

Indeed, he has had the experience of being very close to a nuclear war – or rather of being an advocate of nuclear war (watch the video @ 6:18). Well, as always, only nukes in enemy hands are bad nukes, right?

Posted by Martin Senn on June 22nd, 2010

I am sorry for my scarce posting, but my life is busy these days (final weeks of the term, traveling, … ). I will go back to normal blogging mode in mid-July. :-)

Anyway, on my last flight I had the chance to read Tad Daley’s book “Apocalypse Never” – it is a very good read! In particular, I enjoyed chapter 10 on the scenario of a break-out.

In the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secratries Clinton, Gates, Chu and Adm. Mullen testified on the new START Treaty. The following section is taken from Gates’ prepared statement.

It is not surprising that Russia continues to object to our missile defense program as they have objected to all U.S. missile defense efforts for several decades. The Russians know that our missile defenses are designed to intercept a limited number of ballistic missiles launched by a country such as Iran or North Korea. Our missile defenses do not have the capability to defend against the Russian Federation’s large, advanced arsenal. Consequentially, U.S. missile defenses do not, and will not, affect Russia’s strategic deterrent. To build such a capability – a missile shield of the kind envisioned in the 1980’s – is technologically unfeasible, cost prohibitive, and destabilizing. Therefore we have no plans to do so. Separately from the treaty, we are discussing missile defense cooperation with Russia, which we believe is in the interest of both nations. (emphasis added)

Ok, they do not affect Russia’s deterrent now, but what about a future with smaller arsenals?

Posted by Martin Senn on June 10th, 2010

The ArmsControlWonk features a post on our DPRK missile symposium including a couple of comments – it’s really cool to see the discussion continuing at the Wonk! :-)

As Bharath yesterday posted on India’s nuclear program, I am now posting the announcement of the new book “South Asia at a Crossroads” by Subrata Ghoshroy and Götz Neuneck:

South Asia at a Crossroads is a collection of insightful articles about a number of contemporary security issues in South Asia viewed through a global lens. The book is unique in its ability to illuminate in plain language complex issues which lie at the intersection of science, technology, and public policy. It brings together articles by scientists, diplomats, lawmakers and senior policy analysts from across Asia, America, and Europe on topics that are as much relevant to global security as they are to the region, specifically the two nuclear armed neighbors India and Pakistan, which are the focus of the book.
Among others, the topics include ballistic missile defense; space-based monitoring to improve strategic security; and weaponization of space. It examines the emerging “space race” in Asia. It also turns its attention to the future of nuclear arms control, disarmament, and especially the Non-proliferation Treaty.
It features critical assessments of the recently concluded U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement and looks at energy security for India and Pakistan. As the title suggests, the book explores opportunities for regional cooperation in complex areas of conflict.

P.S. Interested in news on Burma’s nuke and missile program? Click here.

Posted by Bharath Gopalaswamy on June 8th, 2010

We have just released our Yearbook 2010. I have co-authored the chapter on World Nuclear Forces.  A short summary of the chapter can be found on our website. I am also reproducing the relevant summary:

“Nuclear weapon arsenals in 2009
SIPRI estimates that there were around 7500 operational nuclear warheads in the arsenals of the eight nuclear-armed states (the USA, Russia, China, the UK, France, India, Pakistan and Israel). Of these, almost 2000 were kept on high alert and capable of being launched in minutes. Global efforts to reduce or eliminate these weapons moved forward despite a number of setbacks.”

Another interesting development is the June 2nd report on India’s Expanding Nuclear Military site by Paul Brannan, ISIS. Paul has compared this recently released image to an image in 2005 and has concluded that the construction of the site is in its preliminary stages. He also adds that “If the construction seen in the March 3, 2010 imagery is for a new gas centrifuge hall, India’s uranium enrichment capacity at Rare Materials Plant RMP will be greatly expanded.”

This report comes at a particularly important time- on the eve of the the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA’s) governing board meeting and at the start of the first Indo-US strategic dialog.

Posted by Bharath Gopalaswamy, Martin Senn on May 25th, 2010

It is a great pleasure to host a discussion on Robert Schmucker’s and Markus Schiller’s (draft) paper “The DPRK Missile Show – A Comedy in (Currently) Eight Acts” on our blog! You can download the paper here and a brief CV of the authors here.

As you can see below, we are starting this online symposium with a summary of the paper’s conclusions and first comments/questions. Please feel free to join the discussion at any time!

Picture Source: Korea Times

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“The DPRK Missile Show – A Comedy in (Currently) Eight Acts”

Summary of Conclusions (by Markus Schiller)

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is generally assumed to have outstanding capabilities in the development and mass production of ballistic missile systems, especially in reverse engineering and improvement of existing systems. At a closer look it becomes obvious, though, that this common view is wrong.

Numerous independent indications add up to a consistent overall picture:

1) No other entity has ever successfully reverse engineered complex high tech systems with identical performance values.
2) Aside of its claimed successes with ballistic missile production, the DPRK has no noteworthy capabilities on any other field of technology.
3) The DPRK has at least seven different types of long range missiles available, with a total number of test flights that would have been insufficient even for development and production of one single missile type.
4) The high success rate of the DPRK’s few launches is a clear indication for foreign assistance.
5) Several “indigenous” missiles show clear characteristics of early Soviet missiles.

It is obvious that the DPRK acts only as a vendor for other entities. Indigenous missile capabilities are very limited, and it has no operational missiles available beyond 1 000 km range.

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Comments and Questions

Jan Stupl, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation:

General comment: The authors challenge what they believe is the common view about the North Korean missile programs. In order to make their critique more effective, I would propose to add references to their manuscript.  I have seen them making their argument in presentations, so I know that they can provide evidence.  However, for a person not familiar with the subject, the paper might appear like a list of unsupported claims, especially when similarities between North Korean missiles and lesser known Soviet/Russian are pointed out, e.g. the R-55.  I am aware that many other papers in this field do not present evidence either, but this is a good opportunity to stand apart from the crowd. An appendix with collected evidence would make this paper much stronger.

Question 1:  In my opinion, the authors draw a very convincing picture that there is a strong connection between Soviet and North Korean missiles. The absence of extensive testing and the striking similarities between North Korean and Soviet missiles basically exclude the scenario that North Korea started its program from scratch. However, for me the question remains whether it is more likely that North Korea is just redistributing systems which are shipped in from somewhere or whether there are production lines on North Korean soil.
One possible scenario could be that some time in the 1980s North Korea received massive help, maybe amounting to opening a “branch” of Soviet production facilities.  Imagine an entire team including designers, precision engineers and skilled workers relocating to North Korea, bringing blue-prints, know-how and maybe machinery with them. They should have been able to install a production line for SCUD Bs in the matter of years or quicker, especially if they know where to get missing parts that for some reasons could not be produced on-site. As for the motivation: how about supporting the Iranians during the war, which for some reason was not possible to do from Soviet soil? The 1993 wannabe immigrants could have tried to join colleagues already in North Korea.  As of now, this “branch” would be cut-off, has no longer access to lot of resources, but manages to produces some fireworks from time to time. Of course they would want to show progress, but cannot really start any serious program for lack of resources.
I would like to ask the authors whether they think such a scenario would be consistent with the facts they know. The answer probably depends on whether they think it is easier to hide the “transfer” of specialists, compared to the transfer of hundreds of missiles.

Question 2: The authors mention that Iran has gained some indigenous capabilities.  Do they think that Iran has crossed the threshold to independent production of solid fuel missiles?

Ting Wang, Postdoctoral Associate at Cornell Unversity’s Peace Studies Program:

It might be interesting to compare Chinese missile development with DPRK’s projects, which is not underscored in the current paper. As China before 1980 is quite the same as the DPRK right now, same ideology, same industry capacity, same percentage of death for hungry. DPRK is doing what China did between 1960s-1970s.

China’s missile program started with the reverse engineering of Russian missiles (the DF-1 project). The honeymoon between China and USSR ended in early1960s, since then Chinese missile and nuclear program were totally indigenous. The Chinese missile and nuclear weapon program used much less tests than US and USSR did. Due to resource limitations, the Chinese tried their best to dig information from fewer tests

For a technical paper, references are necessary.

Posted by Martin Senn on May 19th, 2010

Ted Postol’s and George Lewis’ ACT article on the poor performance of SM-3 interceptors, which will be the backbone of the Obama Administration’s missile defense program, and a NY Times article on the findings of their study has fueled the debate over the technical feasbility of current missile defense systems. Richard Lehner of the Missile Defense Agency has now published two replies to Postol’s and Lewis’ arguments on the DoD Blog and MDA web-page.

In the post on the DoD Blog, Lehner cites the 2008 satellite intercept as an additional proof of SM-3’s effectiveness (Nathan Hodge’s post in Dangerroom made me aware of Lehner’s reply and the anti-satellite argument). Well, as far as I know, shooting down a satellite, which moves along a predictable trajectory, is a far less challenging task than intercepting a missile. So I am not sure whether the anti-satellite usage of SM-3 is actually a proof for its combat readiness. This is just a quick note on the debate, I will leave the technological questions and arguments to the technological experts …

Meanwhile, the group of experts on NATO’s New Strategic Concept, which is chaired by Madelaine Albright, has published its report. This what the report says about missile defense:

The New Mission of Missile Defence. Defending against the threat of a possible ballistic missile attack from Iran has given birth to what has become, for NATO, an essential military mission. President Obama’s decision to deploy a phased adaptive missile defence will provide more effective, rapid and reliable coverage than earlier proposals. It also puts missile defence fully within a NATO context, with participation open to all Allies and all Allies to be protected. Missile defence is most effective when it is a joint enterprise and so cooperation throughout the Alliance and between NATO and its partners (especially Russia) is highly desirable. (p. 11)

[…]

Ballistic missile defence. The Alliance should have a fuller role in dealing with the emerging ballistic missile threat. The new U.S. phased, adaptive approach to ballistic missile defence provides an opportunity for the development of an effective NATOwide strategy that would add to the defence of populations as well as forces. The U.S. systems to be deployed will be much more effective against the ballistic missile threat to Europe from the Gulf than those previously envisioned. They are not directed against Russia, nor would they threaten Russia’s nuclear deterrent. A NATO missile defence system would enhance deterrence and transatlantic sharing of responsibility, reinforce the principle that security is indivisible, and allow for concrete security cooperation with Russia.

Recommendation:
1. NATO should recognize territorial missile defence as an essential mission of the Alliance. To that end, NATO should agree to expand its Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence System to provide the core command and control capability of a NATO territorial missile defence system.